Clawback provisions – which allow LPs to recoup excessive carried interest distributions from GPs – are increasingly becoming a central focus in GP‑LP negotiations. The importance is highlighted by Upwelling Capital Group’s study which found that approximately one in 14 U.S.‑based PE firms is at risk of a clawback. As a result, LPs are taking a more proactive approach to negotiating GP clawbacks and ancillary protections. Although some sponsors are not giving ground, others have been forced to acquiesce by granting LP-favorable terms (e.g., interim clawbacks) due to the current difficult fundraising environment.
This two-part article series provides context for the increased focus on clawback provisions in GP‑LP negotiations, as well as additional risk mitigation techniques pursued by both parties. This first article provides an overview of the current industry focus on clawback provisions, along with descriptions of additional protections LPs pursue to ensure they receive their share of fund profits. The second article will highlight contractual mechanisms that GPs employ to limit the scope and likelihood of clawbacks, as well as to improve their ability to hold current and former employees accountable for their respective pro rata shares of clawback obligations.
See “How Key PE Fund Terms Are Being Shaped by Current Fundraising Challenges, Liquidity Needs and Distinct Shifts in the Market” (Feb. 9, 2023).
What Are Clawbacks?
Although the concept of a “clawback” is painted with a broad brush, it is useful to distinguish between LP clawbacks and GP clawbacks – the latter of which is the subject of this article series.
LP Clawbacks
Common Scenarios
When LPs are subject to a clawback, they will have to return some or all of the distributions they received at an earlier point in the life of the fund. LPs might be subject to clawbacks if a fund has made distributions to its LPs and no longer has sufficient assets left to cover financial obligation specified in the fund’s limited partnership agreement (LPA), said Tannenbaum Helpern partner Michele Gibbs Itri.
One common LPA requirement is for LPs to indemnify the GP, investment adviser, LP advisory committee or a service provider when a specified scenario occurs, Itri noted. Another clawback scenario is if a purchase price adjustment or indemnification obligation is triggered in connection with the sale of a fund’s portfolio company after the initial distribution of proceeds to LPs. “If, for example, a year after the sale the fund has to cover an indemnity under a sale agreement, then the manager may need to claw back some or all of the cash that was distributed to the LPs,” she explained.
Timing
At present, LP clawback obligations are typically subject to a two-year limit – i.e., two years from the time the distributions took place – and are also often capped at 25% of an investor’s capital commitment, Itri said. “LPs don’t want to be on the hook forever. They want to know, at a certain point in time, they’re not going to have to pay back distributions they receive from a fund.”
Negotiations have become more common, however, around the terms of LP clawbacks, Itri observed. Some GPs are pushing for three-year post-distribution time limits, or for limits set at two years from when a fund liquidates, regardless of when the distributions may have taken place. “The distribution could have been six years ago, but a GP would still have until two years after the fund liquidates to issue an LP clawback,” she explained.
LPs are pushing back at GP efforts to expand time limits of LP clawback obligations. “Institutional investors are trying to negotiate the time period down, or seed investors – the initial investors – are negotiating a change in fund terms, because that really needs to apply across the board to all investors,” Itri continued. As funds vigorously compete to offer favorable terms and lure investors, it is increasingly common for investors to negotiate more favorable LP clawback terms, she added.
GP Clawbacks
If investors do not receive their preferred return – or if the GP receives more than the contractually allotted carried interest allocation – then a GP clawback may be triggered to require the GP to return carried interest it has already received. GP clawbacks are designed to give investors a measure of confidence and security that they are not parking their money in a fund that will fail to perform, and that a manager who does not deliver will not profit from failure.
The likelihood of a GP clawback being triggered depends to a large extent on whether a fund has a European-style waterfall or an American-style waterfall, observed Coran Ober partner David Pentlow. Under a European-style waterfall, a GP will typically not earn carried interest until its LPs receive their initial capital contribution and preferred return. At that point, the typical 80/20 catch-up will come into play, he explained. That waterfall structure largely forestalls a situation where a GP profits disproportionately without having delivered for investors, which reduces the need for a GP clawback.
See “Current Trends and Pressure Points in Negotiations Around Distribution Waterfalls” (Jan. 23, 2025); and “Up Next in SEC Examinations? Waterfall Calculations and Investment Decisions” (May 16, 2024).
Conversely, an American-style waterfall causes profits to be distributed on a deal-by-deal basis, which means that a GP may earn carried interest early in a fund’s life from selling a portfolio company before LPs have received their entire initial capital contribution and preferred return. If the fund suddenly stumbles, however, and its remaining investments end up not being profitable, then a GP may be unjustly enriched before its investors have been made whole, Pentlow stated.
Further, PE strategies generally rely heavily on buying and selling portfolio companies, in pursuit of handsome capital gains over a period of approximately five years, Pentlow noted. “Typically, a PE fund has two to three portfolio companies. Maybe it buys the first one at a nice price and sells it for decent profits, but then the other two are just sitting around,” he posited. “The long-term performance of a fund can be infinitely more variable when a fund pursues investments in a variety of assets with different profiles, solvency and value.”
As a result, GP clawback provisions can be important tools of remediation for investors in funds with American-style waterfalls, particularly if the fund’s performance falters and a conflict crops up between LPs and GPs, Pentlow reasoned.
Increased Attention on GP Clawbacks
Limited LP liquidity caused by a lack of distributions has created a challenging fundraising environment for GPs to navigate. The result has been a “buyers market” that favors LPs in negotiations around fund terms and provisions. Although most might expect that to manifest in reductions in management fees and carried interest, that has not been the case, noted Davis Polk partner Michael S. Hong.
Instead, most negotiating efforts are expended at the margins of economic terms, such as how clawbacks are calculated and structured, Hong continued. “I would say that clawbacks are being wrapped up into the tapestry of more fundamental material economic issues that are up for grabs in the current buyer’s market,” he added. The following are several reasons why clawback provisions are receiving increased attention in current GP‑LP negotiations.
See “Trends in Private Fund Terms and GP‑LP Fundraising Perspectives in the Current Market Environment” (Jul. 27, 2023).
LP Focus on LPA Provisions
How, and whether, clawback provisions are incorporated into fund documents can often depend on a number of different variables, asserted Sadis & Goldberg partner Ron S. Geffner, including:
- the strength of the markets;
- the demand for, and capacity constraint of, the specific product or investment strategy;
- the fund manager’s reputation;
- the sophistication of the manager; and
- the sophistication of the prospective investors.
“The more sophisticated the investor and the larger the investment, the likelier a negotiated clawback,” he added.
To that end, Sidley Austin partner Jennifer A. Spiegel asserted that there is nothing new about investors asking for clawback provisions, or their incorporation into fund documents. A notable uptick has been observable lately, however, among some types of private funds (e.g., closed-end private credit funds) where investors have historically not been quite as assertive about their rights – particularly when an American-style waterfall is in place.
Crucially, investors are also more aware of the types of situations in which they may find GPs to have compromised the investors’ interests and taken undue rewards. As a consequence, they are paying more attention to clawback provisions in fund documents and how they are worded, Spiegel stated. “They want to ensure the clawback is drafted correctly, and by that I mean that the clawback obligation does not just kick in when the GP has received more than 20% of the overall profits, but if the GP got any profits and the LPs didn’t get a full return of capital and a preferred return,” she explained. “To be correctly drafted, the clawback has to address both scenarios.”
See our two-part series: “Latest Trends in GP Removal Provisions, Investment Provisions and Other PE Fund Terms” (Jul. 26, 2022); and “Recent Status of Negotiations of Co‑Investment Access, Management Fees and Other PE Fund Terms” (Aug. 2, 2022).
Broader Applicability of Clawbacks
Historically, investors primarily had to focus on ensuring that standard PE funds with American-style waterfalls had clawback provisions. That is changing, however, as investors become more sophisticated and funds become more complicated.
European‑Style Waterfalls
An interesting recent development is that investors have increasingly insisted on including GP clawback provisions in LPAs of funds that have European-style waterfalls, Spiegel stated. Investors have come to the realization that just because a European-style waterfall is in place, theoretical danger persists where a GP has greater flexibility to reinvest “return of capital” proceeds throughout a fund’s life – which is a particularly common practice with private credit funds, among others.
Clawback risk for a fund with a European-style waterfall is rooted in the sequence in which capital is injected into the fund relative to when the GP may have been in the carry stages of the fund’s waterfall, Hong summarized. “Funds with high recycling capabilities are more prone to sequencing risk because recycling means you have more dry powder that you can call over the life of the fund as compared to funds that have more limited recycling capabilities.”
To illustrate the point, Hong posited a scenario where a GP divested multiple investments in a portfolio, returning capital to investors and, as a result of reaching the profit-sharing stages of the fund’s waterfall, took carried interest. Thereafter, the GP could call capital near the end of the fund’s life to perform one or more follow-on investments, which subsequently underperform and are written off by the GP, he continued. “That creates a scenario where the GP needs to go back to the early stages of the waterfall on a cumulative basis to repay LPs’ initial capital despite the GP having already taken a share of the profits. If the fund is in liquidation, that might result in carry clawback.”
As for the reasons behind the increased focus on clawback provisions in funds with European-style waterfalls, Hong offered two potential explanations. First, he pointed to the rising popularity of private credit funds in the marketplace in recent years. “As credit funds tend to have greater recycling flexibility than their PE fund counterparts, notwithstanding their European-waterfall features, clawback risks have found their way into the current zeitgeist of negotiations,” he explained.
See “ACC and EY Report Examines Growth Trajectory and Recent Trends in Private Credit” (Mar. 6, 2025).
The other potential reason relates to constricted M&A activity over the last 24 months caused by, among other things, high interest rates, political uncertainty around the U.S. elections and ongoing geopolitical tensions. Fund managers have not been divesting their existing portfolio companies or deploying dry powder into new opportunities, Hong observed. Instead, managers have been more likely to deploy capital to bolster their existing portfolio companies via follow-on investments. “As follow-on investments require capital draws late in a fund’s life, there may be some correlation between that phenomenon and people’s awareness around clawback risks,” he reasoned.
See “Dechert and Mergermarket 2025 PE Outlook: Ongoing Fundraising and Liquidity Challenges” (Feb. 6, 2025).
Hybrid and Evergreen Funds
In addition, clawbacks are increasingly coming into play in hybrid funds that invest in illiquid assets, but where LPs either have limited withdrawal rights or remain subject to long lockups and slow payouts, Spiegel observed. Often, GPs of hybrid funds will still receive a significant annual incentive fee despite the slow payout model. “I’ve definitely seen an increase in clawbacks in that context in the last few years, which is unusual because it used to be that clawbacks do not happen after you’re in hedge fund land,” she stated.
The growing creativity of fund structures and compensation plans, and the increasingly hybrid characters of many vehicles, have also made clawbacks more common, Spiegel asserted. As evergreen private credit funds are allowing investors to take part in successive investment periods instead of moving into a harvest period, fund economics tend to play out over a longer time, she reasoned. “I definitely see clawbacks being implemented in these types of evergreen credit vehicles, both on a tranche-by-tranche or vintage-by-vintage basis, and also across tranches.”
See “Emerging Industry Trends Include Rise of Evergreen Structures, Tax Complications and Private Credit Funds” (Jan. 9, 2025).
Additional LP Risk Mitigation Tactics
An end-of-life GP clawback provision merely represents a baseline measure that LPs insist on putting in place to prevent the overpayment of carried interest to GPs. The following are additional mechanisms that LPs request in negotiations meant to both enhance and supplement those clawback provisions to ensure maximum protection.
Interim Clawbacks
Some investors are seizing on the current market dynamics to negotiate for interim clawbacks, with nearly two-thirds (64%) of funds providing them in 2024 per a recent survey conducted by Paul Weiss. Negotiating interim clawbacks into fund documents for funds with American-style waterfalls can spare investors from having to wait until a fund’s final distribution to get back any excess carried interest paid to the GP via an end-of-life clawback, explained Simpson Thacher partner Michael W. Wolitzer.
See “Recent Survey Shows Market Adversity Is Tempering LPs’ Ability to Negotiate Key PE Fund Terms” (Sep. 5, 2024).
Interim clawbacks can be thought of as a concession or a compromise that some sponsors are making to investor demands, Wolitzer stated. Although LPs are not certain to receive that concession, many are highly likely to seek it as a means of curbing the risk that GPs will draw too much carried interest too early in the life of the fund. “Over the last several years, more and more LPs are asking for an interim clawback in the American-style waterfall, just to have a couple of opportunities to evaluate whether a clawback is needed before the end of the fund life,” he reasoned.
Interestingly, there is no market standard for determining the interim point for those clawbacks. “Different types of interim clawbacks exist, coming into play at different points within an investment period, and they are typically the subject of extensive negotiations,” noted Simpson Thacher partner Deborah Gruen. The timing could lie directly in the middle of a fund’s performance period; closer to the beginning or the end; or even at multiple points depending on what LPs and GPs negotiate.
It is worth noting, however, that interim clawback provisions are uncommon for funds with European-style waterfalls, Hong clarified. “GPs of funds with European-style waterfalls do not tend to be in the carry stages until late in their fund lives. Given that, the interim clawback becomes relatively moot, although end-of-term GP clawbacks still persist.”
See “Chasing Waterfalls: Analysis and Market Response to ILPA’s Deal‑by‑Deal Waterfall Model LPA (Part One of Two)” (Sep. 15, 2020).
Escrow Requirements
Another way that LPs will seek to protect themselves from overpayment of carry to a fund manager is to negotiate for an escrow provision to be included in fund documents. Escrow provisions require GPs to put a portion of each carry distribution – typically between 15% and 20%, although that can vary – into an escrow account, Hong summarized.
The agreed portion of carry distributions stays in the escrow account for an indefinite period until any interim or end-of-life clawback provisions, as applicable, are exercised in the fund documents, Hong continued. “Any repayment of proceeds pursuant to a clawback provision is paid first from the escrow account. If the escrow is sufficient, then any balance in the account goes to the GP. If, however, the escrow account is insufficient, then the GP is usually liable to cover the difference of any amount owed,” he explained.
GPs prefer to avoid escrow provisions because they both defer the GP’s receipt of carry distributions and, just as frustratingly, require the cash to sit in the account, earning little compared to the fund’s portfolio, Hong noted. “Often the parties will pre-negotiate for the escrow account to be invested in a prescribed set of low-risk type of instruments,” he explained. “There was a time when some GPs had discretionary authority to invest escrow proceeds into deals, but that is pretty rare now.”
Notably, escrow provisions are far less common than GP clawback provisions for managers going to market with new funds. “Unless a firm has had an escrow concept baked into its documents since early in their life, it is pretty rare for GPs to offer an escrow option as opposed to a clawback,” Hong observed. “That said, GPs will sometimes agree to escrow provisions if they are struggling to fundraise – particularly in the current environment – or if LPs were burned by the GP performing poorly in past funds, resulting in a clawback,” he added.
Individual Guarantees
Clawback provisions in fund documents are direct contractual agreements between a GP and its LPs. Those agreements entail the risk, however, that a GP can become insolvent and unable to repay improperly distributed carried interest under those clawback provisions. As an additional layer of protection, most LPs insist that investment professionals at firms who are receiving carried interest distributions must sign guarantees with LPs on a several, not joint, basis to backstop the agreed-upon clawback obligations, Hong stated. “At the end of the day, those individual guarantees reassure investors that someone will pay them back if and when appropriate,” Wolitzer added.
As a practical matter, individual investment professionals do not sign separate signature pages for guarantee agreements with each LP, Hong explained. “Instead, the guarantee is expressed as a contract for which the LPs are express third-party beneficiaries such that, for all intents and purposes, there is a direct contractual obligation between the employee receiving the carry and the LPs,” he described. Further, it is not structured as a joint and several obligation of each individual guarantor – i.e., each individual is only liable up to their share of the clawback amount, but not sums exceeding what the individual received, he clarified.
It is important to be clear, however, that not all types of fund managers are expected to grant those types of individual guarantees, Hong noted. “Bulge bracket fund managers that are obviously creditworthy are not expected to grant those rights to investors; instead, it’s typically middle-market firms with around 25 investment professionals who receive a slice of carry distributions,” he explained.
Also, it is highly unlikely that LPs will ever practically need to act upon those individual guarantees, Hong noted. “That would be a ‘hell and damnation’ scenario, as no LP would probably ever invest with that firm again if a clawback devolved to investors suing individual guarantors in court for clawback obligations,” he reasoned. “More often than not, if the GP wants to have any going concern value, then they will negotiate with the LPs to buy themselves some time to eventually repay the money themselves.”